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Abstract—Within cloud-based internet of things (IoT) applica-
tions, typically cloud providers employ Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) to ensure the quality of their provisioned services. Similar
to any other contractual method, an SLA is not immune to
breaches. Ideally, an SLA stipulates consequences (e.g. penalties)
imposed on cloud providers when they fail to conform to SLA
terms. The current practice assumes trust in service providers
to acknowledge SLA breach incidents and executing associated
consequences. Recently, the Blockchain paradigm has introduced
compelling capabilities that may enable us to address SLA
enforcement more elegantly. This paper proposes and implements
a blockchain-based approach for assessing SLA compliance and
enforcing consequences. It employs a diagnostic accuracy method
for validating the dependability of the proposed solution. The
paper also benchmarks Hyperledger Fabric to investigate its
feasibility as an underlying blockchain infrastructure concerning
latency and transaction success/fail rates.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Contract, SLA, Cloud, Mon-
itoring, IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a contracting method,
commonly employed by cloud providers to ensure the quality
of an X-as-a-Service (i.e. IaaS, PaaS, SaaS, etc.) [1]. It
specifies rights and obligations of involved participants with
relation to agreed Service Level Objectives (SLOs). An SLA
declares to which level a Quality of Service (QoS) must be
maintained, and what associated consequences (e.g. penalty,
remedy, etc.) applied in case of SLA violation [2] [3].
In current practice of incident management, cloud providers
promise to process incidents in good faith, assuring their
consumers to impose SLA consequences on themselves. While
intriguing, it is typically the consumers responsibility to report
a service level degradation, supported by evidence deemed
irrefutable by the service provider. This is usually a tedious
process and manually handled [4]. Most related enforcement
studies, such as in [1] and [5], assume trust in either service
providers or trusted third parties. However, it can be inviting
for some consumers to manipulate evidence to support vio-
lation incidents. On the other hand, providers may not react
well to poorly formed claims, regardless of their validity [6].
In some scenarios, unresolved disputes have to be escalated to
mediators or other jurisdiction means [7].
Recently, the rise of Blockchain technology invites revisit-
ing existing solutions, where trust is taken for granted; Incident
management is of no exception. The concept of smart contracts
has enabled blockchain-based decentralised applications to
serve various problem domains. Thus, we see an opportunity
in exploiting Blockchain features to enable non-repudiable
enforcement of SLA consequences.
We can list a set of advantages of shifting SLA enforcement
to blockchain environment as follows:
• Improving incident management’s procedures. Reported
incidents can be automatically raised and instantly han-
dled in a non-repudiable manner.
• SLA terms are expressed in a logical format in the form
of a smart contract.
• Records’ immutability can help minimise dispute cases
as well as the need for escalation.
• Service providers can reduce the workforce size allocated
for handling such tedious tasks.
A. Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) The paper proposes a decentralised approach for en-
forcing consequences of SLA violations. It models and
implements a smart contract logic that addresses in-
cidents processing, and automates decision-making on
the compliance level of obligated providers with their
offered SLA.
2) It employs a validation method, known as Accuracy
Diagnostic [8], for examining the dependability of the
modelled smart contract in every development iteration.
3) The paper evaluates the feasibility of Hyperledger Fabric
in terms of both the latency and transactions Success/fail
rate, and provides a set of observations.
The source code of our implementation is publicly available
under GNU GPL V3.0 License on GitHub1. We hope it
forms a base that can help other interested researchers and
industry alike to advance blockchain-based SLA management.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: First,
section II elaborates on the research context, by setting an IoT
scenario as a motivating example, and making use of a real
SLA. It also briefly overviews Hyperledger Fabric, that we
1https://github.com/aakzubaidi/MQTT-SLA-Blockchain-QoS-Enforcement
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adopt as underlying blockchain infrastructure. In section III,
we overview the proposed approach, and delve into modelling
the proposed logic of enforcing SLA consequences. Section IV
presents a simulation experiment on the feasibility of the
approach. It also presents how we validate the smart contract
for every development iteration. Finally, section V evaluates
the performance of Hyperledger Fabric, aiming to assess its
viability as an underlying blockchain infrastructure.
II. RESEARCH CONTEXT
The IoT World Forum sets an Internet of Things (IoT)
reference model, where components are organised in a multi-
layered architecture [9]. It suggests a point where communi-
cation, processing, and storage are being centrally managed.
Cloud services have been widely employed to serve such
centric tasks in most IoT conceptualised architectures [10].
In practice, cloud providers, such as Google IoT Platform2,
provide a set of pay-as-you-go services for registering devices,
handling exchanged data through HTTP servers or MQTT
brokers, processing data, providing analytical tools, and big-
data storage means. Consumers (i.e. healthcare providers) may
find it appealing to outsource such tasks to cloud providers
since it alleviates several IT burdens, including scalability and
maintenance. In return, cloud providers ensure a satisfactory
service delivery through the concept of SLA.
Fig. 1. Example IoT healthcare scenario employing MQTT for data exchange
A. Motivating Scenario
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)3 is an asyn-
chronous data exchange protocol based on publish/subscribe
model. Since HTTP is document-oriented, it is less favourable
when it comes to constraint resources. Therefore, MQTT,
being data-oriented, is a popular data exchange protocol for
IoT applications purposes. The mechanism of MQTT relies on
the concept of topics, to which authorised entities can publish
or subscribe. MQTT brokers orchestrate the data exchanged
between publishers and subscribers. Because of the popularity
of MQTT, several cloud providers offer MQTT brokers as a
service.
2https://cloud.google.com/solutions/iot
3http://mqtt.org/
To elaborate, consider a Telemedicine example where a
healthcare provider hires cloud services. These services de-
pend on a MQTT broker, which is used for communica-
tion and data exchange. For example, Figure 1 depicts an
IoT healthcare application that enables monitoring patients
remotely and reacting in case of emergency. In this simplified
scenario, three major entities communicate over the MQTT
protocol, which are patients, the healthcare provider, and
an ambulance department. These entities publish/subscribe
to topics of their interest. For instance, health data can be
collected by sensors/devices, and then published to a topic
called vital signs. If a patient’s condition becomes severe, both
the healthcare provider and the ambulance department will be
notified through the Emergency topic.
B. SLA Example
Cloud providers cope with IoT requirements by offering
enabling services such as MQTT servers. For IoT scenarios
such as the one presented in section II-A, cloud providers
guarantee the quality of MQTT servers using the concept
of SLA. For this paper, we use the GCP (Google Cloud
Platform) SLA 4 for modelling our approach. The SLA covers
a component for bridging between cloud services and IoT
devices using MQTT. The GCP SLA ensures compensating
consumers when a set of valid MQTT requests results in acci-
dental device connections. The SLA holds the cloud provider
accountable for consequences when the error rate exceeds
10%. For simplicity, we consider the error rate as the total
accidental device disconnections divided by the total number
of valid MQTT requests. For clarity, we formally define the
error rate as in Equation 1, where F stands for MQTT Fail
Requests and V stands for MQTT Valid Requests.
ErrorRate = (
n∑
i=1
F
n∑
i=1
V
)× 100 (1)
Within this paper we consider the GCP SLA as a repre-
sentative example, and base our approach on it for assessing
provider compliance, and for enforcing the violation conse-
quences (when the error rate exceeds the 10% threshold).
C. Service Monitoring
Service monitoring is vital for enforcing satisfactory SLA
compliance [7]. Examples of monitoring/reporting tools are
those surveyed in [5] [11], which can be classified into
proactive or reactive categories. The former predicts potential
failures while the latter identifies incidents that are already in
place. Ideally, cloud providers would apply proactive measures
to prevent violation in the first place. While proactive violation
methods present an exciting class of problems, we still need
to discuss the aftermath of SLA violations [11]. This paper is
limited to reactive monitoring methods, which we employ for
incidents identification.
4https://cloud.google.com/iot/sla
D. Hyperledger Fabric as Enabling Technology
SLA as any other contracting method, is prone to
trust and enforcement issues. Whenever trust is a burden,
Blockchain present itself as a potential underlying infras-
tructure. Blockchain holds appealing principles including, but
not limited to, immutability, decentralised computation, and
a distributed shared ledger controlled by a consensus mech-
anism. The concept of a smart contract allows applications
to benefit from these features, forming what is commonly
referred to as Decentralised Applications (DAPPs) [12]. We
see an opportunity in taking advantage of Blockchain to serve
SLA monitoring and enforcement purposes. This does not
only address trust issues [6] but also expedites and automates
associated processes such as handling violations and decision
making. It also helps reduce the need for manual processing
and human intervention.
We select Hyperledger Fabric (hereafter HLF) [13] for
realising the proposed blockchain-based SLA enforcement.
HLF is classified as a consortium blockchain, composed of
per-identified validating nodes. The permissioned nature of
HLF enables adopting plugable consensus protocols lighter
than Proof-of-work (PoW). The latest official version of HLF
(v1.4.6 as of today) officially supports various Crash-Tolerant
protocols as consensus mechanisms such as Raft [14] and
Kafka/ZooKeeper. HLF supports general-purpose program-
ming languages for representing the business logic as a smart
contract. Supported languages include Golang, Javascript, and
Java. Since all nodes are authenticated and committed for
execution and validation tasks, there is no need for any
execution fee, as it would be the case with public blockchain
technologies. All transactions, whether successful or not, are
immutably stored on the ledger for auditing purposes. Further
details on the transaction flow can be found in [13].
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED CONSEQUENCES ENFORCEMENT
This section provides an overview on our approach, and then
models a smart contract logic that enforces SLA consequences
as per the GCP SLA example presented in section II-B.
A. Overview
As any contractual method, SLA is susceptible to breaches.
In the current practice, SLA violations must be acknowledged
by obligated providers in order to execute SLA consequences.
Figure 2, suggests revisiting the current trust model, by
shifting some such critical tasks from obligated providers to
executable contracts operating in a non-repudiable fashion.
In particular, We shift three main incident management tasks
from obligated providers, which are Incidents processing, SLA
compliance assessment, and SLA consequences enforcement.
Blockchain-based Smart contracts can realise this aim beyond
the influence of any single entity.
We highlight essential considerations for realising our ap-
proach as follows:
• The SLA document in place: We study the SLA content,
and extract key elements which include but not limited
to:
Fig. 2. Overview on the proposed Blockchain-based SLA enforcement
– Participants: their rights and obligations.
– QoS metrics: their definition, measurement, and vi-
olation consequences.
• Executable actions in the SLA must be represented in
the smart contract, for example compliance assessment
and consequences enforcement. The smart contract is then
deployed to the blockchain network.
• SLA awareness within Blockchain: smart contracts need
to have the necessary SLA awareness in order to execute
relevant actions.
• Monitoring agent awareness: we have to consider the fact
that smart contracts are supposed to be terminable and
deterministic [15]. Smart contracts are not optimal for
conducting endless activities such as monitoring. Thus,
external monitoring/reporting means have to be in place
to help smart contracts in forming a decision on the
compliance level of obligated providers. For illustration,
consider the GCP SLA definition of MQTT error rate.
Monitoring agents should collect metrics related to the
performance of the MQTT server such as up-time, the
number of received/sent messages. These metrics help the
smart contract to form a decision on the compliance status
of the obligated provider. That is, monitoring agents must
submit any identified incidents to the smart contract.
The rest of the paper delves into exploiting the smart
contract for processing monitoring logs, and assessing the
conformance of cloud providers to their offered SLAs.
B. Smart Contract Logic Modelling
We use the concept of smart contracts to automate decision-
making on the compliance level of obligated providers (Cloud
provider), beyond the control of centralised authorities. The
decision making is formed with the aid of monitoring tools.
Figure 3 illustrates the proposed enforcement logic mod-
elled as a smart contract. Two stages take place in every billing
cycle (every month, for example). In the first stage, the smart
contract waits for failure events, as per defined in the SLA. For
that, there is an interface for authorised monitoring agents to
invoke whenever there is an incident, as shown in Figure 2. For
every transaction, the smart contract accommodates incidents
by updating the total number of two elements, which are Valid
and Fail MQTT requests. These two elements are essential for
calculating the error rate. It is worth mentioning that update
operations are executed at the state database provided by HLF,
and not in the the immutable ledger. However, every update
operation is backed-up with an immutably stored transaction
for auditing purposes.
The second stage takes place at the end of the billing cycle.
At this stage, the smart contract decides on the compliance
status of the obligated provider. The decision is mainly based
on Error Rate, calculated as per Equation 1. Then, it examines
the calculated error rate against the threshold stipulated in the
SLA in place; say 10% for example. If the smart contract
concludes that the obligated provider has fulfilled its promise
by not reaching the stipulated threshold, then the performance
will be marked as compliant. Otherwise, it marks the per-
formance as Violation and applies the agreed penalty. Either
way, the result will be immutably recorded on the ledger for
reference purposes. The count of both Valid Requests and
Failure Requests are then reset for the next billing cycle.
Fig. 3. Modelling the enforcement logic as a smart contract
IV. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
This section attests the feasibility of implementing our
approach as a smart contract. It also describes how we validate
the dependability of the proposed approach. The smart con-
tract, simulation, and the validation process are implemented
in Java programming language and available as open source
in GitHub5.
A. Simulation and Implementation
The purpose of the simulation is to experiment with the
feasibility of the proposed approach. Figure 4 illustrates the
outlook of the implemented components. First, we employ an
MQTT broker using Eclipse Mosquitto6. Second, we imple-
ment a simple behaviour of a monitoring agent using Eclipse
Paho7. Third, the implemented smart contract, discussed in
section III-B, is then deployed and instantiated using IBM
Blockchain Platform 8. We also developed a bridge using
Fabric Java SDK9, which represents the interface between
the blockchain network and external entities (e.g. monitoring
agents) to enable configuring all necessary elements (such as
identity, access level, crypto materials, etc.).
Fig. 4. Simulation of MQTT Broker and Monitoring agent
The logic of our simulation and testing is as follows. The
monitoring agent continuously publishes testing samples to the
MQTT Broker (Mosquitto). The goal of the monitoring agent
is to observe Valid and Fail MQTT requests. The monitor-
ing agent uses exception handlers and error codes provided
by Eclipse Paho to identify errors and reason about them. We
deliberately cause the MQTT broker downtime to simulate
cloud failure by simply shutting down the MQTT broker
(Mosquitto). Once the monitoring agent detects an availability
issue (downtime), it submits a transaction to the smart contract,
reporting latest Valid and Fail MQTT request. The smart
5https://github.com/aakzubaidi/MQTT-SLA-Blockchain-QoS-Enforcement
6https://mosquitto.org/
7https://www.eclipse.org/paho/
8https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=IBMBlockchain.ibm-
blockchain-platform
9https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-java
contract records incidents as well as valid MQTT requests, and
will keep accumulating incidents until the error rate reaches
10%. Then we test the the smart contract’s ability to mark
the cloud provider’s performance as violation. Overall, by
conducting the above, our proposed approach proves to work
as expected. Following, we describe our validation approach.
B. Decision Accuracy Validation
To ensure the reliability of our approach we consider two
facts. First, the enforcement logic is an assessment tool in
nature, which decides on the compliance level of obligated
providers. Therefore, the dependability of the decision logic
has to be validated [16]. Second, smart contracts operate
beyond the control of a single authority. Therefore, rectifying
a logical error in decentralised applications is not as straight-
forward as it would be in traditional applications [17]. Thus,
this section presents how we validate the dependability of
the enforcement logic for every development iteration on the
smart contract. It examines the two stages of the enforcement
life-cycle, which are the incident reporting as in Algorithm 1
and compliance assessment as in Algorithm 2. For every
development iteration on the smart contract, we execute these
validation algorithms using Junit testing framework.
1) Stage 1: Incidents Reporting: The decision logic is
based on Equation 1, which is composed of two elements:
MQTT Fail Requests and MQTT Valid Requests. Algorithm 1
investigates the smart contract ability to update the values
of these elements correctly. It simulates a monitoring agent
that repeatedly reports incidents to the smart contract. For
each incident, the simulated monitoring agent submits MQTT
Fail Requests F , and MQTT Valid Requests V . The smart
contract will record this incident and update values. The
algorithm queries the current count of both Valid and Fail
MQTT requests, V count and F count, and assert that they
are appropriately updated.
Algorithm 1 Validating correct values update
Input: F , V
Output: F count and V count are correctly updated
1: for i← 1 to Transactions count do
2: Invoke Report Violation (F , V )
3: Wait for transaction resolution
4: Query (F count , V count)
5: if F count OR V count NOT correctly updated then
6: Terminate with error
7: end if
8: end for
9: return V count , F count
We always assume the worst-case scenario, where the
MQTT broker exhibits malfunction behaviour lasting for
the entire 30 days. We adopt the default reporting interval
employed by Google Stackdriver monitoring tool 10, which
is every 60 seconds. Thus, the monitoring agent will keep
10https://cloud.google.com/monitoring/api/metrics gcp
triggering the smart contract every minute. This means the
smart contract should receive 43200 transactions by the end
of the month. Therefore, we iterate for 43200 times, such
that there are new Valid V and Fail F MQTT requests for
every iteration. Thus, by the end of algorithm execution,
V count should equals V ×43200 and F count should equals
F × 43200.
2) Stage 2: Compliance Assessment: At the end of every
billing cycle (assume 30 days), the smart contract assesses
the compliance level of obligated providers based on the
agreed Error Rate Threshold, For example 10%. It calculates
the Error rate as per Equation 1, and compares it with the
agreed Error Rate Threshold in the SLA. To examine decision
accuracy we prepared a set of cases already known to us to be
either Violation or Compliant. The Violation group has 50%
of these cases, which exceed the 10% Error Rate Threshold.
The Compliant group has the other half of the cases, which
does not exceed the 10% Error Rate Threshold. Given the
importance of this assessment task we employ rigorous testing
that validates the decision made by the smart contact. We rely
on a method called Diagnostic Accuracy [8], which employs a
set of measures and calculations based on 2X2 table, as shown
in Table I. The table is composed of 4 elements which are
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP),
False Negative (FN). Let us assume an SLA that stipulates a
service delivery with an Error Rate that does not exceeds 10%;
Otherwise, it is considered a violation case. Then, we consider
TP is the count of the cases that is correctly classified to be
breaching this terms (the 10% threshold). Therefore, TN is the
count of the cases that are correctly classified to be compliant
and does not exceed the 10% threshold. FP and FN are the
cases where the smart contract incorrectly identify cases as
Violation or Compliant; respectively.
TABLE I
DIAGNOSTIC ACCURACY 2X2 TABLE
Violation Complaint
Positive
True Positive
(TP)
False Positive
(FP)
Negative
False Negative
(FN)
True Negative
(TN)
Based on the Diagnostic Accuracy table, we select and
define the following measurements:
• Sensitivity: the proportion of violation cases correctly
classified by the smart contract; calculated as follows:
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
• Specificity: the proportion of compliant cases correctly
classified by the smart contract; calculated as follows:
Specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(3)
• Positive Predictive Value (PPV): The probability of ac-
curate decision on violation cases; calculated as follows:
PPV = (
TP
TP + FP
)× 100 (4)
• Negative Predictive Value (NPV): The probability of ac-
curate decision on compliant cases; calculated as follows:
NPV = (
TN
TN + FN
)× 100 (5)
The goal is to examine the smart contract ability to correctly
classify the prepared cases into their corresponding groups;
either Violation or Compliance. Algorithm 2 illustrates the
conduct of the Diagnostic Accuracy method. First, We feed
all prepared sets of cases into the smart contract. We fill in
table I according to the outcome of the smart contract. That
is, for each case we classify the result of the smart contract
decision on every case to be one of the listed categories (TP,
TN, FP, or FN). We conduct the calculation of Sensitivity,
Specificity, PPV and NPV to find out about accuracy of
the compliance assessment. We implemented this validation
method (Diagnostic Accuracy) using Junit testing framework,
and executed it for every development iteration on the smart
contract. Results are shown in table II.
TABLE II
OPTIMUM RESULTS OF THE DIAGNOSTIC ACCURACY METHOD
Sensitivity Specificity PPV NPV
100% 100% 100% 100%
Algorithm 2 Conducting The Diagnostic Accuracy Method
Input: TEST CASES
Output: Sensitivity , Specificity , PPV , NPV
1: C = {c : c ≤ threshold} # Compliant cases
2: V = {v : v > threshold} # Violation cases
3: TEST CASES = {C ∪ V }
4: for each tc ∈ TEST CASES do
5: assessCompliance (tc) # invoke the smart contract
6: determine whether decision is TP, TN,FPorFN
7: if TP then
8: TP count++
9: else
10: if TN then
11: TN count++
12: end if
13: else
14: if FT then
15: FT count++
16: end if
17: else
18: if FN then
19: FN count++
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: Calculate Sensitivity , Specificity , PPV , NPV
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RESULTS
HLF has proven to perform well for several scenarios. There
exists a set of studies on HLF performance such as those
in [13] [18] [19] [20] which are based on Kafka/Zookeeper
protocol and [21] which is based on PBFT. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no performance benchmarking coping
with the latest development on HLF, where Raft protocol [14]
has been officially recommended as a consensus protocol. In
this paper, we adopt Raft, and thus we focus on the latest
official HLF version 1.4.6.
The previous section looked into the smart contract logic de-
pendability. However, we still need to confirm the feasibility of
HLF as an underlying Blockchain technology. Therefore, this
section investigates how HLF network copes with consecutive
incidents (assuming a very poorly performing cloud provider).
In particular, we look into HLF’s latency and transaction
success/fail rate.
A. Experimental Setup
We focus on the most demanding functionality in our
modelled smart contract, which is processing the received
incidents, as described in Algorithm 1. At the infrastructure
level, Table III illustrates both, the testing environment and
HLF configuration.
TABLE III
HYPERLEDGER FABRIC (HLF) NETWORK DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION
Factor Settings
Host Machine
Local running MacOS Catalina OS,
2.9GHz Dual-core intel Core i5 CPU,
2GB LPDDDR3 Memory Ram.
Containerization
Docker version 2.2, Engine version 19.3.5.
Allocated Resources:
CPUs: 3, Memory: 7GB, Swap: 3GB
Network Topology
HLF Version 1.4.6,
2 Organisations,
4 committing peers,
5 orderers, each one in a separate container.
One dedicated channel,
LevelDB is used as a ledger database.
Consensus Protocol Raft Protocol
Endorsement Policy One peer of each organisation
Chaincode Settings
Execution Timeout 60 seconds
Programming Language Java
Logging Enabled
We employ a modular blockchain benchmarking project
under Hyperledger Umbrella, called Hyperledger Caliper 11
for deploying the smart contract, simulating the behaviour of
monitoring agents, and benchmarking.
Table IV summarises the experimental settings of 4 different
test cases. They are all similar in terms of benchmarking
settings, where we denote similarity as ∼ to indicate no change
11https://hyperledger.github.io/caliper/v0.3/getting-started/
in the settings. However, these test cases are different in terms
block batching configurations. For this experiment, we assume
consecutive transactions. Therefore, we aim to figure out a
suitable block batching configuration that avoids concurrency
issues while maintaining a reasonable throughput and latency.
We employed two factors for defining the readiness of a block
for validation, which are: timeout, and maximum allowed
number of transactions per block; whichever occurs first.
These two factors vary in every testing, seeking the best
performance possible.
TABLE IV
EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS (HYPERLEDGER CALIPER)
Facet Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Function
under test
Report Violation
(Asset update)
∼ ∼ ∼
total workers
(client thread)
1 worker ∼ ∼ ∼
control rate:
Fixed Rate:
300
transactions
∼ ∼ ∼
Sent Transactions
(per second)
1 Tps ∼ ∼ ∼
Execution
Timeout
30 seconds for:
- Chaincode engine
- Worker
- Caliper runtime
∼ ∼ ∼
Fabric Block Batching Configuration
Block Batching
Timeout
(milliseconds)
1000 500 1000 500
Transactions
per block
10 10 1 1
Our testing plan is that, we set all parameters in Table IV to
the minimal values possible, and then we scale gradually until
we reach a bottleneck. For example, we started from 1 worker
sending only one transaction. However, we encountered con-
flicting transactions for all different test cases as reported
and discussed below. So we limited the number of workers
to 1 for all four test cases and be more focused on Block
batching configuration. We started with 1 second timeout and
10 transactions per seconds in test case 1. Then, we went to
see how HLF would perform with lower values in the rest of
test cases.
B. Results and Observations
1) Latency: All four test cases in Table II reveal that HLF
latency, measured in seconds, is generally acceptable given the
limited resources of the host machine. We observe no major
difference in average Latency, which exhibits a relatively
similar behaviour. We can see from case 4 that, these is a clear
fluctuation between minimum and maximum latency. We can
attribute this to the high rate of commits on the ledger across
the network [22], resulted by generating a block every half
second milliseconds. This leads many transactions to miss the
chance of being included in the current block, and thus wait
for the next one.
TABLE V
RESULTS OF LATENCY AND TRANSACTIONS SUCCESS RATE
T1 T2 T3 T4
Success 298 297 299 295
Fail 2 3 1 5
Max Latency (s) 1.22 1.54 1.43 1.68
Avg Latency (s) 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.78
Min Latency (s) 0.68 0.68 0.77 0.34
2) Success/Fail Rates: We have to recognise the fact
that HLF employs an optimistic locking mechanism, namely:
Multi-Version Concurrency Control (MVCC) to prevent a
known blockchain problem called double-spending problem
[23]. This mechanism caused all test cases to experience
transactions failures due to conflict in MVCC Read-Write sets.
The MVCC conflict is triggered because HLF experienced
consecutive transaction reporting incidents to the smart con-
tract. The evaluation results reveal that, test case 3, (1 Tps
and 1s timeout) experiences the least transactions failures.
The worst performance is observed in test case 4, where
block batching is set to the minimum possible (1 Tps and
500ms timeout).
C. Observation and Remarks
While MVCC has proven to work well for some scenarios
such as money transfer, it is not the case for demanding
applications. For example, it is abnormal for a money transfer
application to receive frequent updates on the same account
within a few seconds. However, In our case, we ideally expect
consecutive transactions from monitoring agents. Nevertheless,
the lock mechanism causes some monitoring transactions to
experience MVCC conflicting Read-Write sets, represented
as (key, value version). When a transaction tries to update
a key, it acquires the latest version of that key. Since our
scenario assumes consecutive monitoring transactions, failure
can accrue when transactions carry out update operations
based on an obsolete key version. This situation can happen
when an unsettled update transaction (not committed yet to the
ledger) finally manages to be committed, causing a change of
the current value and version. Therefore, any transaction based
on an obsolete version is to be invalidated regardless of how
correct they are [24].
There have been several workaround solutions to address
this matter. For example, Composition-key can bypass MVCC
validation because there is a new key generated for every
transaction. However, this contradicts with the purpose of
MVCC and introduces cumbersome key management. A retry
mechanism is another workaround, such that client applica-
tions are notified of such conflicts and then retry submitting
again. While applicable for some scenarios, this may not be
suitable for others. There are also other techniques such as
queuing transactions before submitting them to the blockchain.
However, this does not benefit from the high throughput
promised by HLF.
To sum up, in all test cases presented in table IV, the MVCC
conflict was present, which is an unpleasant issue that has to
be addressed. We do not expect such an issue to appear when a
few incidents are occurring less frequently. However, in certain
extreme scenarios, we expect HLF to exhibit malfunctions
due to MVCC conflicts. For example, when a very poorly
performing cloud provider causes monitoring agents to report
incidents every 1 second. Even when we attempt to increase
the frequency of block batching, there is value in addressing
and mitigating this malfunction [22] [25].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a blockchain-based SLA enforcement
approach that aims to automate SLA incident management. It
focuses on processing SLA violations and decision-making on
the compliance status of cloud providers obligated by an SLA.
It validates the dependability of the proposed enforcement
logic based on accuracy diagnostic method. This paper also
investigates HLF as underlying technology using Hyperledger
Caliper. The evaluation showed that HLF performs well in
terms of latency and possibly throughput. HLF can poten-
tially serve the purpose of our proposed enforcement logic.
However, since our approach expects high throughput from
monitoring agents, the issue of HLF MVCC conflict has to be
addressed. Otherwise, we cannot safely assume dependability.
In future work, we will investigate a viable enhancement on
HLF, or at least adapting our proposed approach in a way that
does not compromise the performance of HLF.
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